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I examine a production economy with a financial sector that contains multiple layers of credit. Such 
layers are designed to constitute credit chains which are inclusive of a simple mortgage market. The 
focus is on the nature and contagion properties of credit chains in an economy where the financial 
sector  plays  a  real  allocative  role  and  agents  have a  nontrivial  choice  of  whether  to  default  on 
mortgages or not. Multiple equilibria with different rates of default are observed, due to the presence 
of strategic complementarities. Default can trigger a financial crisis as well as constrain the purchases 
of factors of production, thus leading to potentially serious effects on real activity. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper, I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium monetary growth model of credit chains in a 
closed-economy payments system that shares the spirit of Freeman (1996, 2002), Hernandez-Verme (2005) and 
Freeman and Hernandez-Verme (2008.) I must point out outright that I do not aim at replicating the facts before 
and after the subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. My purpose is simpler but equally interesting, I think: to 
illustrate the presence and functioning of the chains of different layers of credit in the overall structure of a 
financial system where spatial separation is nontrivial. 
What must a good model of large payments systems have? Zhou (2001) established some basic guidelines 
that we can use for the evaluation of this class of theoretical models: 
“I propose four main criteria that a payment system model should satisfy. First, it should directly 
model the underlying transactions of goods or financial assets for which payments have to be made 
so that the system design affects the allocation of real resources. Having met the first requirement, 
the  model  should  treat  consumption/investment  debt,  which  is  generated  by  the  underlying  real 
resources transaction, as distinct from payment debt, which is created only for payment needs. The 
final two criteria have to do with the two sides of the main conflict; the model should incorporate 
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both  settlement  liquidity  shortage  and  credit  risk,  preferably  generated  endogenously  by  agents’ 
choice or action.” Zhou (2001,) pages 29-30. 
Zhou (2001) has also argued convincingly most of the previous literature does not satisfy all four criteria but for 
the Freeman model (1996,) which satisfies three of the four criteria. However: 
“One unsatisfactory feature of the Freeman model is that the liquidity shortage is generated from the 
exogenously imposed payment flows, rather than as an outcome of agents’ endogenous payment 
decision.” Zhou (2001) page 43. 
Green  (2007)  sets  four  challenges  for  models  of  the  payments  system  long  the  same  lines.  What  he  calls 
Challenge  3 is “to  provide  sound  advice  about  payment  risk,”  which  is  clearly  related  to  understanding  the 
underlying processes behind default in equilibrium. In this paper, I undertake this challenge by incorporating 
endogenous default decisions. The following innovations in the model will prove to be of the most important: 
I.1) I introduce a simple mortgage market that interacts with a standard market for consumption debt. 
I.2) Debtors may choose whether to repay their debt or not based on their best interest. 
I.3) There is a strategic group of banks who are local monopolies in offering deposits and mortgage loans. 
I.5) Lenders play a double role in that they are the productive sector in this economy. 
I.6) The presence of a shock that sizes down (or up) the value of the real state at the time when the 
mortgages must be repaid, affecting the nontrivial choice of whether to default on debt or not. 
There  are  three  groups  of  agents  that  interact  in  the  payments  system  in  this  model  economy: 
lenders/capitalists, debtors and banks. Only banks are not price-takers. Moreover, debtors will belong to one of 
two  groups  in  equilibrium:  debtors  who  default  on  their  debt  and  debtors  who  repay  their  debt.  The  main 
underlying hypothesis is that, even in the absence of a bubble in the housing market, the structure of the financial 
system itself makes it vulnerable to default, systemic risk and downturns in economic activity. In particular, a 
shock that starts in the housing market will be transmitted to the real sector through its effects on the financial 
system. Moreover, the analysis of welfare in equilibrium will be shown to defy conventional wisdom in terms of 
who wins and who loses as a result of a crisis in this economy. 
The contributions of this paper with respect to the previous literature can be listed as follows: 
1.  Rates of default that may be nonzero in equilibrium, as opposite to the findings of a varied set of 
papers in the previous literature. Interestingly, I show that it can be in the best interest of debtors and 
for the economy as a whole to default under a particular set of circumstances: the debtors choose 
whether to default on debt or not based upon the individual realization of a shock that alters the 
resources available to debtors
2. This shock may result in the presence of aggregate uncertainty at the 
economy level in certain cases. 
2.  The focus is on absolute default, as opposed to temporary default: debtors not only are late in repaying 
their debt, they never get to repay it. 
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3.  The clear interdependence among default in the mortgage market and default in the consumption credit 
market: once a debtor is within reach of collection efforts, she must repay both types of debt. 
4.  There is a linkage between production possibilities and default on debt, and thus, the model illustrates 
the transmission mechanism of shocks that go from the financial system to the real economy. 
5.  The presence of strategic complementarities that may lead to the presence of multiple equilibria. 
Thus, the model in this paper satisfies all four criteria suggested by Zhou (2001) and default on debt 
reduces the resources available to lenders for purchasing labor, subsequently reducing output for given levels of 
fixed investment. A gripping result of the analysis is that there is always a positive rate of default in equilibrium, 
whether it is unique or not. Moreover, universal default and universal repayment cannot obtain in equilibrium due 
to  the  nature  of  the  shock  that  continuously  hits  this  economy  and  the  signaling  to  lenders  by  debtors, 
respectively.  The  economy  turns  out  to  be  regular:  for  a  particular  set  of  economic  fundamentals  there  are 
multiple  equilibria  but  there  is  finite  number  of  them,  implying  that  equilibria  satisfy  the  local  uniqueness 
property, but not global uniqueness. Typically, we can show the existence of two steady-state equilibria that are 
associated with different rates of default that can be ranked in terms of welfare, as a result of the presence of 
strategic complementarities. I must point out that I have not introduced explicitly any rules for the settlement of 
debt or for loss-sharing in case of default and thus the model so far does not produce any clear cut criteria for 
equilibrium selection yet. I must also point out that, against standard intuition, the banks obtain positive profits 
only when the equilibrium rates of default are sufficiently high; my interpretation of this result is that banks might 
be risk lovers in equilibrium. 
Young debtors formulate a contingent plan in light of the realization of the shock that they expect they will 
experience the following period. This works through the choice of a cut-off value from the distribution of the 
shock that incorporates a threshold effect, such that realizations below the cut-off will lead to default while 
realizations above the cut-off will lead to repayment. A crisis in this model takes the form of an innovation in 
such cut-off value of the shock. I would like to highlight four results of the analysis: 
Result  #  1:  A  mortgage  crisis  reduces  output  in  this  economy  by  reducing  the  resources  available  to 
capitalists for purchasing labor. 
Result # 2: Crises also reduces the aggregate welfare of debtors. However, this effect can be misleading, 
since the debtors who default experience welfare gains, while the “honest” debtors who choose to repay 
their debt are made worse-off. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, the result shows that the debtors 
who default do not suffer from this shock and that the ones who are in the need of help, probably from 
government agencies, are the “honest” debtors. 
Result # 3: The lenders, who are equivalent to the general public who holds deposits on banks, experience 
significant welfare gains as a result of a crisis. This, then, is another sector that is not in need of government 
assistance. 
Result # 4: A crisis increases the bank’s income but it also reduces its costs, thus increasing the bank’s 
profits in equilibrium. This result seems to go against conventional wisdom, but remember that there are no   4 
investment  banks  in  this  model  nor  mortgage  backed  securities.  This  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that 
commercial banks seem to be doing reasonable well in light of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Then, a mortgage crisis seems to hit the honest lenders the hardest. It is still the best choice for them to 
repay their debt, but they are worse off when compared to the situation before the crisis. It is clear that this sector 
would be in need of government assistance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the environment and the first part of the 
economic fundamentals. Section 3 describes the preferences and actions of the different groups of agents, and 
Sections 4 and 5 discuss general equilibria and welfare. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses potential for 
future research. 
2.  The Environment 
Consider a model closed economy that consists of one central settlement location and  2 I   triplets of outer 
islands,  indexed  by  1,2,... iI  .  The  triplets  surround  the  Central  Island  and  the  triplet  1  i   is  located  in  a 
counter-clockwise-direction respect to triplet  i . Time is discrete and indexed by  1,2,... t  . All strategic agents 
are overlapping generations that live for 2-periods, and population is constant. Throughout the paper, I assume 
that all contracts are enforceable when on the Central Island, but not on the outer islands: once on the Central 
Island, islands are within collection efforts. There is a fiat currency that is the only legal tender and circulates in 
this economy. For simplicity, I will label this currency as dollars. 
In this model economy, each date has two parts: morning and afternoon, and transactions/actions take place 
sequentially in each of them. If strategic agents choose to travel to the central island, they must do so in the 
morning of their old age. On the central island, clearing and settlement of debt will take place through a third 
party, which I will interchangeably call the centralized settlement institution or monetary authority throughout the 
paper. 
2.1  The Main Economic Actors 
There are three groups of agents in each triplet i . First, debtors and lenders are price-takers, while the banks have 
local monopolistic power. There is a continuum of debtors with unit mass on the first island of the triplet, which I 
will call debtors i , and a continuum of lenders also with a unit mass on the second island of the triplet, which I 
will call lenders i . Finally, there is a monopolistic commercial bank on the third island of the triplet, which I will 
call bank i . This bank is a local monopoly in triplet i  but in the economy as a whole there are I  banks. 
There is also a nonstrategic agent on the central island that I will call the monetary authority, which is also 
the  central  settlement  institution.  Each  commercial  bank  must  create  a  reserve  account  with  the  monetary 
authority.   5 









2.2  The Goods 
I now turn to describe the types of goods in this economy. Every period, there are five goods in this economy. The 
first kind of good is the young-lender i ’s endowment good. Each lender is endowed with  0 x  units of the good, 
and this endowment symmetric in all triplets (lenders are ex-ante identical), but this good is island-specific. The 
variable 
i
t p  represents the nominal price of a unit of a young lender born in triplet i , and it is measured in dollars 
per good at date t . The second good is also related to the lenders: a lender born in triplet i  can produce a final 
good when old. This good is also island-specific, and its price at date t  is 
i
t   dollars per good in triplet i . 
In the third place, the young debtors born in triplet i  have an endowment good in the amount of    0,1 y . 
This good is also island-specific, and it is only attachable as down-payment for purchasing real estate:  y  is the 
fraction of the value of a house that debtors i  can put as a down-payment when young. This good is not otherwise 
traded. 
Fourthly, the monopolistic bank in triplet i  is endowed with  0 z  units of an agent-type and triplet-specific 
good. Bank i  can only use this good to partially finance mortgage loans to young debtors born on the same triplet, 
at the price  i
t  , measured in dollars per unit of the good at t  in triplet i . This good is not traded otherwise. 
The fifth “good” in this economy is actually a factor of production: labor services. Young debtors born in 
triplet i  are endowed with one unit of non storable labor each. There is free mobility of labor across triplets and 
labor  is  homogeneous  across  agents  and  islands.  Labor services  are traded for  the  nominal  wage 
t w   in  the 
afternoon of date t .   6 
2.3  The Assets 
There are six different assets in this economy. In the first place, we have the consumption debt (IOUs) issued by 
debtors born in triplet  i  to lenders in triplet  1 i , so that the former can purchase the endowment good of the 






  is set on triplet  1 i  at date t  by young lenders. This 
loan must be repaid next period using fiat money. 
Secondly, there is a fixed stock  I  of identical houses, such that there is one house per each debtor on each 
triplet. In each triplet, there is a continuum of houses with unit mass that is located in the debtors’ island. The 
price of a house in triplet i  is 
i
t q  dollars at date t . Houses do not depreciate and they are not mobile, but real state 
will be subjected to a shock that we will discuss in the next section. 
Third, young lenders born in triplet i  can accumulate physical capital by investing when young. One unit 
of the endowment good invested at t  yields one unit of triplet-specific physical capital at  1 t , which depreciates 




  denotes the capital stock per young lender born in island i . In the fourth place, 
there is fiat money issued by the monetary authority, and M  denotes the overall nominal money supply at date t , 
which I assume is constant for simplicity. Fiat money has both intermediate and final uses. The intermediate uses 
are to pay mortgages in full, to settle IOUs and to purchase the lender  i ’s final good. However, money’s final 
goal is used to purchase labor. Thus, the relevant price regarding fiat money is the price of labor    t w  and the 




The fifth asset consists of m ortgage contracts issued by  bank  i  to debtors  i . The promised real gross 




 , and mortgages must be repaid in full with fiat money the 
next period. Finally, young lenders born in triplet i  can also make deposits in the monopolistic bank of the same 
triplet in the amount 
i




 , which is paid at date  1 t . 
2.4  Uncertainty 
In this economy, all the young debtors born in triplet i  are ex ante identical. However, they anticipate that a shock 
will be realized early in the morning of their old age. This shock will affect the amount of real state left to old 





t  is a continuous random variable that 
represents the fraction of real state that is left for old household  j who was born at t  in triplet i  by. This variable 
is i.i.d. across debtor households, triplets and time. In the remainder of this section I will drop the supra-scripts in 
order simplify the notation and to focus on the intuition.   7 
The random variable  1 t    has support on the interval  ,
LH    , where I assume that    0,1
L    and  1
H   . 
The function   
1 t
g 
  denotes the stationary p.d.f. of the shock, while   
1 t
G 
  denotes the associated c.d.f. Both 
the p.d.f. and the c.d.f. are public information, but individual realizations of the random variable are not: they will 
be known only to the individual  debtor. For tractability, I will assume throughout the rest of the paper that 
1 t 
  


























  is a multiplicative shock that alters the resources available to old debtors at  1 t . The old 




     dollars early in the morning of date  1 t  to settle the mortgage 
contract in full, but her resources are scaled down (or up) to   
11 1
ii
t t t qy 
     . The old debtor gets to enjoy the 
house only if it repays the mortgage in full. However, before she sells the house, she must repair it, incurring in a 







  dollars to bring the house back to its original condition








  . In case the debtor defaults, the bank seizes the house and it must make 
the same repairs before selling it. 
Young debtors expect the shock to hit them early in the morning of their old age, but they cannot anticipate 
the exact value of the realization of 
1 t 
  that will obtain. Then, all that young  debtors can do is to formulate a 
contingent plan in which they  choose  a  cut-off value 
1 t 
   from the support of the distribution,  such that 
1 L t H
 
  holds. In particular, debtor households will choose to repay their mortgage when the realization of 
the shock is such that 
1 1 t t 
   , while they will default when 
1 1 t t 
    obtains. As we will see later, the choice of 
repaying or defaulting on a mortgage is, at the same time, a choice of repaying or defaulting on IOU: all these 
transactions must take place on the central island and once the debtor is within reach of the collection efforts, it 
must repay all her debts. 
Default is also costly to debtors in utility terms. Old debtors may consume (use) their houses when old in 
the  afternoon:     
1 11
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 









    obtains:  the  old  debtor  must  hide  and  thus  she  must  forego  the  utility  of  the  house  she 
purchased when young. 
                                                 













  dollars.   8 
The stock of houses left in a particular triplet after the shocks are realized and before the houses are 










        


        ,  which  can  be either  smaller or  greater 
than one. The latter illustrates the presence of aggregate uncertainty, since typically   1
HL   . After the repairs 
are paid for, the stock of houses per triplet goes back to   
1
0
11 dj  . 
One  can also  calculate the  probability (rate) of  default  in  a  particular island  by  using  the  Law  of  Large 




   denote  the  probability  of  default  in  particular  triplet  i   at  1 t ,  then, 
     








      
    
      . The reader may notice that I keep the supra-script i  on the rate of 
default, since there is a potential for multiple equilibria in this economy. The effective interest rates then will be 







  in equilibrium. 
2.5  Endowments of Goods and Technologies in Triplet i  
Endowments are distinct, based upon the group a particular agent belongs to. 
2.5.1  The Lenders. All young lenders are endowed with  0 x   units each of an endowment good, which is 
island-specific and it is non storable. They are also endowed with an investment technology that allows them to 
accumulate physical capital that will become effective the following period. This technology is island-specific and 
not transferable, and so is the capital. 
When old, lenders are endowed with a constant-returns-to-scale technology that allows them to produce an 
island-specific final good by utilizing both the triplet-specific physical capital and the homogeneous labor. Both 
capital and labor are essential in production. The technology is triplet-specific and not transferable, but the final 
good is tradable. To fix ideas, we assume that the production function is given by       
1
1 1 1 1 ,
ii
t t t t F K L K L
  
     , 
where 01  . Lenders have no other endowment when old 
2.5.2  The Debtors. Young debtors are endowed with    0,1 y , where  y  represents the fraction of the value 
of a house that they can put as down payment for the mortgage contract. This endowment good is island-specific 
and only attachable as a down-payment for a house. In addition, they are endowed with a technology for issuing 
IOUs to young lenders  from  island  1 i , and  this  technology is island-specific  and  not  transferable as  well. 
Finally, also when young, debtors are endowed with one unit of non storable labor that they will sell to either old 
lenders or old banks; labor is homogeneous across agents and triplets. Debtors have no endowment when old. 
2.5.3.  The Banks. When young, a bank is endowed with  0 z   units of an endowment good, regardless of the 
triplet. This endowment will be used to partially finance mortgages. The young bank has a monopoly on the   9 
following two activities in triplet i : first, they can offer deposit contracts to young lenders, and, second, they can 
package  mortgage  contracts  to  be  offered  to  young debtors. These  last  activities  are  island-specific  and  non 
transferable. The bank has no endowments when old. 
2.5.4.  The Initial Old. At  0 t , there is a generation of initial old agents in each triplet i  with the same size as 
any regular generation. They hold the initial supplies of assets in this economy. Thus, the initial old debtors hold 
the endowment of houses in each triplet, given by  1 II . The initial money supply (the monetary base) is 
distributed equally among triplets in the amount of   
00
m M I   dollars
4. The money supply in a particular triplet 
is distributed proportionately to initial old lenders and the initial old bank. Notice that the latter implies  I  






, which is an endogenous initial condition.  Finally, the 
initial stock of capital per initial old lender in triplet i  is given by 
0
i K , implying that there are I  exogenous initial 





2.6  Monetary Policy and the Aggregate Money Supply in Public Hands 
The monetary policy in this model economy is very simple: I assume that the supply of high power money is 
constant, such that  ,0
t M M t    . In addition, the  I  banks in this economy must hold legal reserves with the 
central bank in the form of domestic currency reserves, where    0,1   denotes the fraction of deposits that each 
bank must hold each period. The fraction of legal reserves is the same for all triplets. Moreover, in this model 
economy, commercial banks give loans to young debtors, who use them to purchase houses. Thus, the aggregate 






M M p d 

      dollars. Notice that there is no s econdary 
money creation role played by banks, since those funds are already allocated into the purchase of houses and do 
not circulate into the economy again. 
2.7  Markets for Houses and Factors of Production 
The characterization of the market for houses is very simple. There are  I  triplet-specific markets for houses in 
which young debtors born in a given triplet buy a house each either from old debtors or the bank in the same 
triplet. The depiction of the markets for factors of production is very simple as well. In the first place, there is an 
integrated market for labor: labor is homogeneous across triplets, and young workers can work on any triplet they 
choose. The price of labor is the nominal wage at date t , given by 
t w , and the relevant measure of the real wage 
is given by  
1 i
tt wp
 , since they wish to consume the lenders’ endowment good from triplet  1 i . On the other 
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   can be used by old lenders i  to produce 
their island-specific final good at date  1 t . 
3.  Preferences and Actions 
In this section, I discuss the preferences and potential choices of each of the three types of strategic agents, as well 
as the problem they each solve. The focus is on a typical generation born in triplet  i  at date  t . Recall that the 
composition of each generation is constant over time: there are lenders, debtors and one bank which will interact 
not only with each other, but also with either agents from other triplets or agents from other generations. 
3.1  The Lender from Triplet i  
All lenders from triplet i  are ex-ante identical. Each lender wishes to consume 
2, 1
i
t  units of the final good i  that 
they produce in the afternoon of their old age. When young, she allocates her endowment good as follows. First, 
early in the morning, she sells part of her endowment to young debtors from island  1 i   in exchange for IOUs in 
the amount of 
i
t s  dollars. Second, still in the morning, she deposits 
i
t d  units of her endowment in the bank of her 









  will be used at date  1 t , together with labor, to 
produce the final good. The details of the lender’s time line are presented in Figure 2. 
 
a.m.  p.m.  a.m.  p.m. 
Youth  Old age 


























































































































































































































   11 
In the morning of the next period, all lenders must travel to the central island in order to get the repayment 
of their IOUs from debtors and the return of their deposits from the bank. Next, in the afternoon, each old lender 
uses the return on her deposits and the payment of the IOUs she holds to purchase labor and produce. She also 




  dollars, and 
uses these proceeds to purchase labor as well. Next, before the end of the afternoon, the old lender produces her 
triplet-specific  final  good   using  the  constant  returns  to  scale  technology  given  by 
       
1
1 1 1 1 1
, , 0,1
i i i
t t t t t




    




The preferences of a lender from island i  born at date t  are given by 
    2, 1 2, 1 ln
ii
tt u
    (1), 














,  (2a) 
 
1 1 1 1 1 11 1
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           

   


,  (2b) 
   
1
1
2, 1 1 1 1
1
i
i i i t








   

    .    (2c) 
Thus, the problem of a young lender from triplet i  is given by 









































      (3b) 
 
1 1 1 1
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 , the rate 
of default. As a result, the necessary first order conditions for this problem, assuming an interior solution, are 
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.  (4c) 






 , which illustrates the fact that labor is paid according to 
its marginal product. Notice as well that (4a) together with (4b) imply that there is no arbitrage between repaid 

































          
  (4d) 
3.2  The Debtor  j  from Triplet i  
All debtors    0,1 j  in island i  are identical in every respect but for the realization of the shock that will hit them 
in the following date. The realizations of this shock are debtor and triplet-specific and its distribution is common 
knowledge. Each debtor knows that the shock will hit her next period, but she does not know what its realization 
will be at the moment when they are making their choices. Then, all debtors must formulate choose a contingent 
plan that will be adjusted depending on the realization of the shock. In addition, I assume that debtors do not have 
a bequest motive, so they must sell their houses before they die. The details of the debtor’s time line are presented 
in the figure below. 
Young debtors born on triplet i  wish to consume 
1,
i
t c  units of the endowment good that is property of the 
young lenders born on triplet  1 i ’s in the morning. Since they have nothing of value to offer to lenders at this 




t t t b p c
   dollars to be re-paid using fiat money in the morning of  1 t  on the 






 . At this time, they also sign a mortgage contract with the bank 




  next period. Houses are indivisible good, and 
they can buy only o ne house. The mortgage contract requires young  debtors from island  i  to make the down 
payment 
ii
tt D q y for a house in the morning of their youth. Finally, at this point of time, they also choose the cut-
off value    from the distribution of shocks, in the manner described in sub-section 2.4. In the afternoon, young 
debtors sell their labor. They work for either old lenders or old banks on any triplet they choose in exchange for   13 
the nominal wage 
t w . By this point in time, the choices of 
1,
i





t D  and the supply of labor are 
already inelastic. 
 










tt     obtains, the old debtor chooses to default on all her debt; as a result, 
she can hide away in island  2 iI   where nobody knows her and she does not have to pay for repairs to the house 
(the bank does it.) But this choice also entails foregoing any enjoyment the house can bring, since the house goes 




tt     holds instead, it is in the debtor’s best interest to travel to the Central Island and repay all 





   dollars for repairs but she also gets to enjoy the house. Recall that all 
repayments of debt must be made on the Central Island, using fiat money. If a particular debtor chooses not to 
repay her mortgage, she cannot repay her IOUs either, since she would get caught once she is on the Central 
Island, and she cannot sell the house later, since the house goes to the bank in case of default. As a result, the 
choice of whether or not to default is also a choice of whether to default on consumption debt and enjoying their 
house or not when old. 
Later, in the afternoon, the old debtor would like to purchase the final good produced by old lenders in 






   dollars. She must pay for this good at the time of the 
transaction using the fiat money she has left, and she can do this regardless of her choice of whether or not to 
default, since nobody knows her in island  2 iI  , nor they care about her having repaid all her debt or not. 
a.m.  p.m.  a.m.  p.m. 
Youth  Old age 

























































































Go to Central 





























Do not go to 
Central Island, no 
repayment, hide 
Consume lender (i+I/2)’s 
good and enjoy the house 
Consume lender (i+I/2)’s 
good, does not enjoy house   14 
Let  me  discuss  briefly  how  debtors  implement  their  contingent  plans.  Each  old  debtor  j  learns  her 











  , the debtor decides that is not in her best interest to repay her mortgage and IOUs. Instead, she 



































   dollars




 . Finally, in the afternoon, she travels to island  2 iI   
to purchase the old lender’s final good. 
The lifetime utility function of a debtor is given by 
     
,
1, 2, 1 1 1 1, 2, 1 1 , , , ln ln
i i i i j i i i
t t t t t t t u c c h c c h 
        ,    (5) 














,  (6a) 
ii
tt D q y   (6b) 
i
t t t t t t m w w L w a          (6c) 





   obtains) will face the following constraints 
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    .    (8b) 

















 .   15 
Thus, the problem that debtor  j  from triplet i  must solve is 
     
1
1 1
1, 2, 1 2, 1
1, 2, 1 2, 1 ,,,
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    
    (9) 
s.t.  (6a), (7a), (7b), (8a), (8b), and 
1 LH t   
  
and taking all prices as given. The latter is a standard problem of expected utility maximization. After integrating 







 , of the following objective function
6 
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   
,  (10a) 
where: 
   
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   
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,  (10b) 
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      
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.  (10d) 





  and    A   are increasing in  . Second,   
2, 1 1 1 tt t A c q  
   is positive. Next, I proceed to discuss 
and evaluate the first order conditions for this problem. 




 is given by 
 
     
1
11
1 2, 1 2, 1
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       
    .  (11a) 
To  discuss  the  properties  of  the  debtor’s  solution  for     1
1
ii
t t t bp  
 ,  we  must  evaluate  different 
possibilities using (11a). I use a simple fixed point technique
7. The results show that  
* /0 bp  does exist and it 
                                                 
6 See the Technical Appendix for details. 
7 For details, see the Technical Appendix.   16 
is unique, with some qualifications. First,  
*
bp  does not exist for 
L   . Second, there exists a value  MH    
such that      
*
1 t t M
b p w  

 . 
Now I turn to the choice of the cut-off value. The first order condition with respect to 
1 t 
  is given by 
 







 .  (11b) 








  holds regardless of 
the  value  of     from  the  standpoint  of  the debtor  and,  thus,  we  can  treat  it  as  fixed  for  now. Second,  the 
expression in (11b) is  positive  when 
L   , implying  that  the latter is not  a  solution for  the  maximization 
problem. Third, the expression in (11b) decreases with  . Two cases may arise, based on the particular value that 
H   may take: first, when 
H   is sufficiently low, 
H    is a corner solution, and the solution is unique. Second, 
when 
H   is large enough, 
H    is an interior solution. The two cases are depicted in Figures 4a and 4b below. 
Figure 4a: Corner Solution for the Cut-off Choice by Debtors
1 t  




Figure 4b: Interior Solution for the Cut-off Choice by Debtors
1 t  
  1 , t u   
L H  17 






   may take, to see 
whether they can be a solution to the debtors’ problem. 




  obtains, the debtor would choose to always 
repay. Obviously, it must be the case that     
2
2, 1 1 1
i i I
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cw   

 
 . The latter implies that the following 
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    
   
 
     
  (12a) 
for 
L    to be a solution to this problem. Obviously, this is not the case when  0,
LL    , implying that 
L    
cannot be a solution when the potential negative effects of the shock are significantly large. As an example, when 
debtors know that their house can be totally destroyed by the shock, some positive mass of them will choose not 
to repay. The latter is consistent with the previous examination of (11b) that states that 
L    is not a solution. 
Thus, equilibria with universal repayment do not exist for this economy. 
Solution with Universal Default. Suppose now that 
1 H t 
   could obtain in equilibrium. In this case, the debtor 
would  choose  never  to  repay  her  debt.  Thus,  for  this  to  be  a  solution  it  must  be  the  case  that 
   
2
2, 1 1 1
i i I
t H t t t
cw   

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,  (12b) 
which must hold for 
1 H t 
   to be a solution. Condition (12b) means that, for values of 





  is a solution, which is illustrated in Figure 4a. 
However,  for values of 
H    that  are  sufficiently  high,  equilibria  with  universal  default  do  not  arise. 
Instead, equilibria are interior solutions for this problem, and 
1 LH t   
   obtains. The latter can be explained 
by the fact that when debtors know that the equity in their houses can increase significantly, a positive mass of 
them will choose to repay in order to rip-off these benefits. 






 . In 
this case,   
2, 1 2, 1 1
ii
tt t cc 
    must hold, implying that 
1 t 
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.  (12c)   18 
Thus, equilibria with some default do exist, but we cannot guarantee global uniqueness. 
3.3  The Bank from Triplet i  
The bank in triplet i  is a local monopoly and she starts with zero reserves when young. She packages and offers 
deposit contracts to young lenders and mortgage contracts to young debtors. In addition, the bank must hold 
currency reserves from  t  to  1 t : a fraction    0,1   of the dollar-value of the young lenders’ deposits. Let 
i
t   
denote the amount of dollar-reserves held in the reserves account in the monetary authority. Figure 5 illustrates 
the details of the bank’s time line. 
3.3.1  Deposit Contracts. The bank offers deposit contracts to young lenders born on triplet  i . Each young 
lender must deposit 
ii
tt pd   dollars with the bank early in the morning, and keep them in the bank until the early in 




  per unit of good 
deposited, to be paid  early in the afternoon of date  1 t  . The bank has the monopoly in offering these deposit 
contracts in triplet i . The return on deposits will be paid to the lenders once they are on the central island, at the 
same time the mortgages are repaid. 
 
3.3.2  Mortgage Contracts. Young lenders would like buy a house worth 
i
t q  dollars in the morning, and they 
aim at borrowing from the bank for this purpose. The mortgage contract specifies the following: 1) the young 
lender must put a down payment of 
ii
tt D y q  dollars at the time of signing the contract. 2) The bank lends the 
a.m.  p.m.  a.m.  p.m. 
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remainder, which is    1
i
t yq   dollars, and the debtor purchases the house. 3) The old lenders must repair the 







    dollars in the morning of date  1 t  , after which they own the house and they 




  dollars. In the case of default, the bank i  appropriates the house instead, and 








  denotes the real gross interest rate on 
loans set by the young bank at t . It is worth pointing out that the bank has the monopoly in pooling the resources 
available, given by her endowment good and the fraction   1    of the deposits in her vaults, and this must also 
be feasible. While the mortgage contract is signed at the bank’s island, all repayments must take place on the 
Central Island in the morning of date  1 t  . 




   units of services when old in t he 




t t t w p a




   units of services. Her utility function takes the 
following form: 
   
11 ln
ii
tt u a a
  ,  (13) 
The young bank’s budget constraints are given by 
  1
i i i i i
t t t t t z p d q y           (14a) 
i i i
t t t pd     ,    (14b) 
Combining (14a) and (14b), and defining the bank’s profits, one obtains the constraint faced by an old bank: 
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.  (14c) 



















  and the prices 
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 , i.e. the bank will pay the 





 . In this case, 





  from equation (4d), such that  
     
 
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,  (16a) 






   is increasing in 
1 t

 , from the bank’s standpoint. 
On the other hand, the condition in (15b) indicates that the bank will charge the maximum possible interest 




  will be such 
that     
2
2, 1 2, 1 1 1 1
i i i I
t t t t t
c c w 

    
  obtains: old debtors must consume the same amount, regardless of whether 
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.  (16b) 
However,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  equilibrium  interest  rate  on  loans  increases  with 
1 t

   or not.  To 
summarize, equations (16a) and (16b) represent the bank’s profit-maximizing choices. 
4.  General Equilibrium 
In this section, I summarize the conditions that must hold in a general equilibrium. I proceed by blocks. In the first 
block, I present the four conditions related to the financial and asset markets. The market for IOUs must clear, for 













    (17a) 
Next, the market for mortgages clears at t  when  
    11
i i i i
t t t t z p d q y            (17b) 
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M M p d I w 

         (17c)   21 
ii
t t t pd     .   (17d) 






I L a I

        (18) 
holds, and, due to the particular structural characteristics of capital creation, the market for physical capital always 
clears. 
In the third block, I present the conditions for the different markets for goods. The market for the lender i’s 














     (19a) 
is satisfied, while the market for the lender’s final good clears when 
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  (19b) 
Now, I turn to discuss the properties of the key variables in the model in a symmetric equilibrium. 
5.  A Symmetric General Equilibrium and a Mortgage Crisis 
The structure in this economy is such that agents who belong to a particular type but were born in different triplets 
are ex-ante identical. In comes naturally, then, to pay attention to symmetric equilibria.  
A symmetric equilibrium is defined as one in which all triplet-specific variables 
i
x  are equal to their 
counterparts from all other triplets  ,
j







 , and so on, with the exception of the 
realizations of individual-specific shocks. This exercise will allow me to point out the potential for strategic 
complementarities that underlies this economy. 
I define a mortgage crisis as a positive innovation in 
1 t 
 . The reader will notice that the main equilibrium 
quantities and interest rates are a function of 
1 t

  in equilibrium. In what follows, I describe the properties of the 
gains/losses of the different agents in equilibrium when there is a mortgage crisis. 
5.1  Labor Purchases by Old Lenders and Total Output 
The following equation defines implicitly the purchases of labor by old lenders  
     
 





























    
      
 
       
.  (20a)   22 
Notice that   
1 1 t t
L 
   is properly defined if and if only if 
1 t Kx 
   holds
8.Equation (20a) illustrates the fact that 
the labor purchases by old lenders are a function of the cut-off value 
1 t 
 , but also of 
1 t K
 , since capital and labor 
are complements in production. However, the latter is inelastic and independent of 
1 t 
 , since it was chosen by 
the capitalists in their youth. Interestingly,   
1 1 t t
L 
   is a key indicator of the old lenders’ ability to produce their 
final good, for a given 
1 t K
 . The following proposition illustrates the changes in the old lenders’ output when 
facing an innovation in 
1 t 
 . 
Proposition 1 An innovation in 
1 t

  reduces the ability of old lenders of purchasing labor  by reducing the 
resources available to them. The latter also reduces their ability of producing their final good, thus reducing its 
supply in equilibrium. 
Proof: After differentiating (20a) with respect to 
1 t 
  and an extensive rearrangement of terms, one obtains that 
 
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,  (20b) 
indicating  that  the  lender’s  purchases  of  labor  fall  in  the  face  of  an  innovation  of 
1 t 
 .  Second, the  total 
production of the final good 
1
1 t Y K L
 
  depends on both capital and labor purchases. At the time when an 
innovation of 
1 t 














      .    (20c) 
This implies a reduction of total output with an innovation of the cut-off value of the shock. Q.E.D. 
5.2  The Welfare of Old Debtors in a Mortgage Crisis 
In  a  symmetric  general  equilibrium,  the  following  basic  conditions  illustrate  important  properties  that  are 
consistent with the contingent plan of action that debtors formulated when young: 
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,  (21a) 
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 .   23 
First, equation (21a) indicates that the marginal old debtor –the one who experiences the realization 
1 t 
  - is 
indifferent between defaulting and repaying her debt. Next, condition (21b) illustrates two facts. On the one hand, 
an old debtor who experiences a realization below the cut-off value will be worse-off than defaulting if she 
chooses to  repay  her debt  since     
2, 1 1 1 1 t t t t
cw 
   
  would obtain. On the other hand, an old  debtor who 
experiences realizations of the shock above the cut-off value will find it in her best interest to repay her debt, since 
   
2, 1 1 1 1 t t t t
cw 
   
  holds. Equation (21c) describes the consumption of an old debtor who chooses to repay her 






   obtains, the old debtor will choose to default on her debt and 
she will consume   
2, 1 1 1 t t t
cw 
  






    obtains, the debtor will choose to repay her debt 
and she will consume       
2, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2, 1 1 t t t t t t t t t
c w q c     
        
       . 
I now turn to the analysis of the effects of an innovation of 
1 t 
 , which are described in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 An innovation in 
1 t 
  affects the welfare of the two groups of old debtors differently: it makes the 
debtors who chose to default on their debt better-off, while the debtors who chose to repay their debt  are worse-
off. However, the group of old  debtors as a whole  is made worse-off by the increase in 
1 t 
 . Moreover, the 
number of debtors in the first group increases, while the number of debtors in the second group decreases. 
Proof: I start with the consumption of debtors who choose to default in equilibrium. By differentiating (21a) with 
respect to 
1 t 
 , one obtains the following 

















    .  (21d) 
Equation (21d) indicates that old debtors who default are better-off with an innovation in  1 t   . The fraction of 




Regarding the consumption of debtors who choose to repay their debt, one must differentiate equation (21c) 
with respect to 
1 t 
 . By doing so, one obtains 
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 .  (21e) 
Interestingly, equation (21e) indicates that an innovation in 
1 t 
  causes the old debtors who chose to repay their 
debt to be worse-off than before the crisis. Finally, the fraction of debtors who choose to repay their debt, given   24 
by    
1 H H L t
   

 , decreases with   . The latter is consistent with the reduction in 
2, 1 t c
 . These two effects 
continue until     
2, 1 1 1 1 t t t t cw 
   
   , where 
1 t 
   is the new cut-off value of the shock. 
I now turn to analyze the aggregate welfare of debtors, given by  
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After some non-trivial effort, I was able to show that 
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,  (21g) 
indicating that the welfare of old debtors considered as a whole is reduced by an innovation in  1 t   . Q.E.D. 
Interestingly, Proposition 2 illustrates the fact that, when a mortgage crisis occurs, the debtors who default 
experience welfare gains, while the “honest” debtors will be made worse-off. Moreover, the losses experienced by 
the “honest” debtors dominate, making the debtors as a group worse-off. This result is the more appealing when 
one confronts the conventional wisdom around the subprime mortgage crisis, where a case is being made to 
attempt to improve the conditions faced by the debtors who have been forced to default on their mortgages. It 
would appear that, instead, the case shall be made to help those who are trying to repair their mortgages, not the 
ones who defaulted. 
5.3  The Welfare of Lenders in a Mortgage Crisis 
Now I am in a position to analyze the welfare of the old lenders in equilibrium. A lender’s welfare depends on her 
consumption of the final good she produces, 
2, 1 t . In turn, following equation (3a), it transpires that the lenders’ 
consumption depends on both the amount produced of the good and the consumption of the old debtors. The 
proposition below presents some very provoking results that involve the lenders’ welfare in a time of crisis. 




Proof: Imposing the general equilibrium conditions in (3a) and differentiating with respect to 
1 t 
 , one obtains 
         
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          
.  (22a) 
The former equation indicates that an innovation in 
1 t 
  increases the old lenders’ consumption in equilibrium. 
This, of course, will result in a welfare gain for these agents. 
Q.E.D.   25 
The expression in (22a) indicates that, contrary to what one expect, the lenders’ welfare improves in the 
time of a crisis originated by innovations in the cut-off value of the shock. Given the circumstances, one would 
tend to look first at the reduction of output as one factor that would undermine the lenders’ welfare. However, the 
reduction in the overall debtors’ welfare dominates this effect. Thus, the old lenders are made better-off at the 
expense of the old debtors. 
5.4  The Welfare of the Bank in a Mortgage Crisis 
The welfare of the individual banks is directly related to their profits, which take the form of purchases of labor 
when old. After imposing the general equilibrium conditions on (14c), one obtains the following expression 
   
1 11 t tt a    
  ,  (23a) 
where    1 t 
  represents the bank’s income/revenue function and    1 t 
  denotes the bank’s cost function. I 
proceed now by first analyzing each of these functions separately. 
5.4.1 Properties of the Bank’s Revenue Function. The revenue function in a general equilibrium is given by 
      22
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 (23b) 
The evaluation of the revenue function at the extreme  values of the distribution of  1 t    provides interesting 
insight. I start by evaluating the revenue function at 
1 0
L t 
  , and obtain 
 
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. (23c) 
Thus, the bank would receive negative revenue for values of    that are sufficiently low. However,    1 t  
  
increases with  1 t   , as one can deduct from the following expression 
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. In the limit, it transpires 
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  
      

  holds.  In  summary,  the  bank’s  revenue  function  is  an 
increasing and convex function of 
1 t 
 , which happens to be negative for low enough values of its argument. 
5.4.2  Properties  of  the  Bank’s  Cost  Function.  The  bank’s  cost  function  in  a  general  equilibrium  has  the 
following form 
 
   
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    . (24a)   26 
Equation (24a) indicates that there are two forces at play in the cost function: the effect that increases the interest 
rate on deposits as 
1 t

  increases, and the effect that reduces the deposits under the same conditions. The latter is 
apparent from the following expression
9 
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.    (24b) 
Equation (24b) suggests that the costs function is nonlinear in  1 t   . In particular, the costs are increasing in 
1 t 
  for values of 
1 t 
  that are  close enough to  L  , while they decrease as 
1 t 








  holds, indicating that costs are a strictly concave function of the cut-off value of the shock. 
5.4.3 Properties of the Bank’s Profits Function. The diagram below illustrates simultaneously the behavior of 
the bank’s revenue and costs as functions of 
1 t

 . I restrict my attention to the analysis of the equilibria that have 
economic meaning, as described in the following proposition. 








 , where profits are positive. 
Proof: The bank uses her profits to purchase labor. Since one cannot purchase negative amounts of labor, and 
because the bank has no supply of labor to offer when old








  since 
1 0
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  hold. Q.E.D. 
 
                                                 












 and  
tt
bp. 
10 One could think as well of the possibility of endowing old banks with labor when old, but this seems to complicate matters 




























Figure 6: The Bank’s Revenue, Costs and Profits   27 
In this model, even though banks are local monopolies, they are vulnerable to the presence of allocations 
where  their  operation  is  not  economically  viable.  Contrary  to  conventional  wisdom,  the  banks  will  prefer 
allocations associated with higher rates of default and risk, since only there can they expect to make a profit and 








   can  also  be  interpreted  as  equilibria  in  which 
financial autarky is present and the market for mortgages does not operate. In the latter case, though, the market 
for IOUs could still be operative. One can then say that, in this model economy, banks are slaves to risk and 




  holds, there is universal default and banks could not subsist since deposits would be close to zero. 
5.5  Multiple Equilibria 
5.5.1 Consumption Debt in a Mortgage Crisis and Multiple Equilibria. The real value of the IOUs issued and 
its properties will indicate the direction of the strategic interaction present in equilibrium in this economy. I first 
combine (11a), (16a) and (16b) and then impose an interior solution. The following expression defines implicitly 
tt bp  as a function of 
1 t 
 : 
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Equation (25a) is a nonlinear equation. If one were to observe that 
tt bp  increases with 
1 t

  in equilibrium, this 
would indicate the presence of strategic complementarities in general equilibrium. If  tt bp  were to decrease with 
1 t    instead, it would point to the fact that strategic substitutability dominates in equilibrium. 
Proposition 5. 
tt bp  is increasing in the cut-off value of the shock, but only over the interval   ,
LM  , where 












  obtains. 
Proof:  
a)  Boundaries for the domain of 
tt bp . 
  First, 




  Second,     
11 t t t t
b p w 

  does not obtain in equilibrium. Two reasons explain th is. One, the lenders’ 
investment into capital must be strictly positive, and two, lenders will realize that debtors will not have any 
resources left to repay their mortgages, thus defaulting on both mortgages and the IOUs. 
                                                 
11 See details in section 2 of the Technical Appendix.   28 
b)  After excruciating pain and suffering, I was able to find that
12 
















  (25b) 
where I have assumed that 
1 0
t dL d
  , in order to fix ideas. Moreover, one observes that    1 0
t t t d b p d
   
everywhere but on the interval 
12




      and    1 0
t t t d b p d
   obtains instead. Thus, 
there exists an interval 
13 ,    , for 
23H    , where more than one equilibrium can exist, in the sense that 
the same value   0
t t
bp  transpires for more than one value of 
1 t 
 . Graphical analysis in Figure 7 indicates 
that at most three equilibria can arise. Q.E.D. 
 
The previous result is very interesting. It implies that, in general, when 
1 t

  is higher, the young  debtors 
know that there will be a higher rate of default in the following date, and thus choose to borrow more, since they 
will very likely choose not repay it. Thus, the equilibrium in this model economy has the potential for strategic 
complementarities, which could lead to the presence of multiple equilibria , as it is the case in the interval 
13 ,    . However, I must point out that there is a limit to this effect, since values of 
1 t 
  such that 
1 M t 
   do 
not obtain in equilibrium. I  must also point out that the amount issued of IOUs increases at the expense of 
deposits, which are perfect substitutes from the standpoint of the lenders. 
5.5.2  The Interest Rates on Deposits and IOUs and Multiple Equilibria. The interest rates play a very 
important role in defining the properties of the equilibria in this model. I start by discussing the properties of the 
                                                 














Figure 7: The Amount Issued of IOUs and Multiple Equilibria   29 
interest rate on deposits and IOUs. These two interest rates are equal in equilibrium because there is no arbitrage 
in rates of return on assets that are perfect substitutes. In addition, the return on both deposits and IOUs represent 
a significant source of income to old lenders. After imposing equilibrium conditions on (16a), one obtains the 
following expression 



































The reader may notice that, at date  1 t  , 
1 t K
  is independent of 
1 t 
 , since it was determined before the 
shocks were realized. However, this is not the case for 
1 t L
 , which is affected by the default of debtors. One could 
alternatively regard the interest rate on loans in terms of the return on capital, which is a perfect substitute to both 
deposits and IOUs. Let   
1 1 1 t t t
k K L
  
  denote the capital-labor ratio and   
1 t k
   the  marginal  product  of 
capital. Then, the equilibrium interest rate on deposits can also be expressed as         
11 1 1 1
ˆ 1
tt t t t Rk  
       , 
implying that there is no arbitrage among the returns of all the assets available to young lenders. 











  is decreasing over the interval   ,
LR
    and decreasing when    1 ,
RH t      , where 
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 . Moreover, this interest rate grows without upper bound as 
1 t 
  grows closer to 
H
 . 
Proof: Differentiating (26a) with respect to 
1 t 
  yields 
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.  (26b) 
The first term inside of the curly brackets in (26b) is negative and decreasing in  1 t   , while the second term is 
positive  and  increasing  in 
1 t 
 .  It  is  apparent,  then,  that   there  exists  a  value    ,
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R   . Secondly, after evaluating (20a) at 
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  , one obtains 
























,  (26c) 
proving the second part of this proposition. Q.E.D.   30 
 
Proposition 6 indicates that there may be two equilibria for a given fixed value of the interest rate on deposits 
0 R  , as illustrated in Figure 8 below. On the one hand, the value 
1
ˆ   corresponds to an equilibrium where the 
interest  rate  is  R   and  there  is  a  low  rate  of  default.  On  the  other  hand,  the  value 
2
ˆ    is  associated  with  an 
equilibrium where the interest rate is also equal to  R , but there is a high rate of default instead. 
5.5.3  The Interest Rate on Mortgages and Multiple Equilibria. The equilibrium interest rate on mortgages 
1 ˆ
t 
  plays a twofold role in this model. First, it is one of the key factors that affect the decision  by debtors of 
whether to default or not in equilibrium. Second, it is the main source of income for the old bank, thus affecting 
her profit and the amount of labor services 
1 t a
  that she will be able to purchase and consume. After imposing the 
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  is a somewhat complex function of 
1 t 
 , making the analysis of its properties a 
bit complicated. Given the latter, I  thus proceed by using a modified version of  my fixed-point technique. I 
present the results in the following proposition. 




  in equilibrium: 






  is a smooth, nonlinear and strictly concave function of 
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Figure 8: The Interest Rate on Deposits and Multiple Equilibria   31 
ii.  Strictly positive interest rates on mortgages in this model exists only for the range 
12 ,     such  that 
   
1 1 1 2
ˆˆ0
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Part i: After differentiating equation (27a) with respect to  , one obtains the expression 
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positive and decreasing in 
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Part ii: There exist two values of 
1 t

  such that     
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ˆˆ0      , for 













 . Q.E.D. 
 
It follows, from Proposition 7, that there exist two equilibria for a fixed real interest rate on loans   , as indicated 
by Figure 9 below. The first equilibrium is associated with 
*
1  , indicating a low rate of default 
*
1  . On the 
contrary, the second equilibrium has the cut-off value 
*
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Figure 9: The Interest Rate on Loans and Multiple Equilibria   32 
fact that strategic complementarities are present in this model economy. One, however, must still be careful when 
making statements about the number of equilibria in this economy due to the properties of the bank’s profits in 
equilibrium. The latter rule out a set of low enough values of 
1 t

  for which the bank’s profits are negative. 
6.  Discussion and Conclusions 
I have presented a model of the payments system built from micro-foundations. The model sheds some light on 
how to interpret the results of the subprime crisis for the different groups of agents. The model displays the 
following features: 
a)  A significant part of exchange is financed with debt: debtors’ early consumption and housing. 
b)  Debt, regardless of its type, is settled by third parties: a centralized payments system as opposed to 
bilateral settling. 
c)  The final repayment of debt must be in terms of fiat money. 
d)  Debtors have a nontrivial default choice that depends on their levels of debt and expectations about 
other debtors’ behavior, among other things. 
e)  There are multiple equilibria with different rates of default. 
Some of the results I found go along with conventional wisdom: a mortgage crisis results in a liquidity crunch that 
reduces aggregate output in this economy by reducing the resources available to lenders for purchasing labor. 
Also, honest debtors experience significant welfare losses when a mortgage crisis hits the economy. 
However, some other results go against conventional wisdom, but do not defy, I believe, general intuition. 
First, there is always a positive rate of default in equilibrium, regardless of whether there is a mortgage crisis or 
not,  and  typically  there  are  two  equilibria  with  different  rates  of  default.  Second,  the  debtors  who  default 
experience welfare gains, while the “honest” debtors who choose to repay their debt are made worse-off. Thus, 
defaulters do not seem to need government assistance but borrowers who are making an honest effort to honor 
their debts do. Third, the general public who holds deposits on banks experience significant welfare gains as a 
result of a crisis in spite of the fall in output. However, there is a caveat here: lenders do not supply labor and thus 
are not affected by a reduction in the levels of employment; future research will look to modify this feature. This, 
then, is another sector that is not in need of government assistance. Fourth, a crisis increases the bank’s income 
but  reduces  her  costs,  thus  increasing  the  bank’s  profits  in  equilibrium.  This  result  seems  to  go  against 
conventional  wisdom,  but  remember  that  there  are no  investment  banks  in  this  model  nor  mortgage  backed 
securities. Finally, standard results that believe that higher rates of default reduce social welfare do not seem to 
hold in this model economy. 
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1.  The Closed-Form Solution for the Debtor’s Expected Lifetime Utility. It is given by 
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Thus, this expression becomes 
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    .  Integrating  by parts,  one 
obtains:   34 
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Next, working on the last term of (A.5), one gets the following expression: 
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Substituting (A.6) into (A.5), the expression becomes 
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Expressing (A.7) in terms of the original variables of the problem, one finally gets: 
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Next, substituting (A.8) into (A.3), one obtains the following expression 
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Finally, after simplifying, one obtains the closed form of the original expected lifetime utility 
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LHS  denotes the left-hand side of (11a) and RHS  its right hand side. They are defined as 
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It is apparent that  LHS  is decreasing in   bp while  RHS  is increasing in the same argument. To simplify the 
notation, I will denote the optimal choice (fixed point) of real debt by  
*
/ bp . In addition, I must point out that 
RHS  is a decreasing function of 
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function   
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bp . This solution is unique, and the reader may notice that   
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  until it 
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Figure 10: The Borrower's Choice of the Real Value of the Consumption Debt
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3.  Proof of Proposition 5 
The elements in equation (25b) are defined as follows: 
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and    36 
       
   
2, 1 1 1 2, 1
31
1 2, 1 1 2, 1
1
t t t t H
t







   





.  (A.14) 
It is straightforward to show that     
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